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REPLY TO CRITICS 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin* 
I am grateful for the thoughtful and challenging responses 
of the group members and pleased to have the opportunity to 
elaborate upon the thinker-based approach in reply. I wish Ed 
Baker were still here to continue the conversation alongside. 
Unfortunately, my remarks will be tentative, speculative, and 
most regrettably, partial. The excellent issues and questions 
posed by the commentators deserve a longer and more detailed 
treatment than time and space allow.  
Broadly speaking, the responses fall into four categories, 
raising methodological issues, questions about scope, worries 
about under-inclusivity, and worries about over-breadth. I will 
address them only roughly in turn, because, given overlap, a 
strict separation would prove too rigid. 
METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE 
Vince, Steve, Tim, Jim and Susan posed a number of 
pertinent questions about the methodology operating in the 
backdrop of my proposed approach, its scope, and the 
theoretical advantages I associate with it. 
My general approach is to start with the First Amendment 
and to ask what arguments for freedom of speech would make 
the most justificatory sense of its inclusion and its deontological 
status in a legitimate constitution. My short answer is that a 
legitimate, operative democracy both presupposes its citizens are 
functional thinkers and moral agents and, further, must treat 
them as such to respect their human rights. To respect the status 
 
 *  In addition to my gratitude to the group members, I owe particular thanks to 
Heidi Kitrosser, Steve Shiffrin and Terry Stedman for reactions to this draft and to 
workshop participants at Pepperdine Law School, Queen’s University, University of 
Virginia School of Law, and the NYU Colloquium on Legal, Political and Social 
Philosophy, whose critical reactions to A Thinker-Based Approach influenced this reply.  
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and significance of its citizens qua thinkers, the state cannot 
retain its legitimacy while undermining the conditions necessary 
for the development and exercise of each member’s capacities 
for free thought. Instead, given the significance of these 
capacities to each individual and to our joint social project of to 
cooperate and self-legislate justly, it must make the protection of 
those conditions a foundational priority. A freedom of speech 
protection is essential to that mission. 
This immediately raises the question of scope and limits. 
Jim asks, why, then, would there be a state action requirement in 
the First Amendment? That is, why wouldn’t the thinker-based 
theory condemn all limitations on the freedom of thought, 
whether the source of the limitations was the state or a private 
entity? In a complementary way, Tim might be read as asking, 
why wouldn’t such an approach suggest requirements of positive 
provision—to establish schools and libraries, e.g., rather than 
merely to refrain from abridgment? Generally, mightn’t what 
falls under a freedom of thought approach exceed what is 
typically thought of as protected under a freedom of speech 
rubric? 
It is, in my view, a strength of the theory that it helps to 
explain what state abridgments of free speech have in common 
with private and social abridgments.1 It also seems like a strength 
that the theory can explain the continuity between the idea that 
a commitment to freedom of speech may require governmental 
abstinence from active obstructing disfavored speech and the re-
lated idea that this commitment may demand certain positive 
provisions by the government, including but not necessarily 
limited to protection against hecklers and other forms of 
attempted private censorship, as well as provisions to ensure fair 
access to public fora for expression.2 
Let me start with Tim’s question about the relationship 
between freedom of speech and freedom of thought. Tim’s 
suspicion that there are aspects of freedom of thought that may 
 
 1. This is not a unique virtue of this theory (although it does not as clearly hold of 
government-centered theories). For example, Mill’s truth based approach to freedom of 
speech supplies reasons to be as concerned about social censorship as about 
governmental censorship. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 161–64 (Penguin 
Classics 1985) (1863). 
 2. Here, I agree with Tim wholeheartedly. See T.M. Scanlon, Comment on 
Shiffrin’s Thinker-based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 327, 332 
(2011). 
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not be well-captured or well-protected fully by a ‘freedom of 
speech’ protection may be correct. Although, for the most part, I 
think the connection is fairly close. In any case, as I will later 
argue (not that I take Tim to disagree), it is not a theoretical 
defect if a freedom of thought protection ranges beyond a 
strictly construed free speech protection. 
Three points may clarify my view of the connection between 
freedom of thought and freedom of speech: First (for most 
people in most circumstances over an extended period of time),3 
freedom of thought cannot be achieved on one’s own, solely 
within the confines of one’s mind, because (complex) thought 
itself requires, for its development and refinement, access to 
others’ thoughts and opportunities for the externalization of 
thoughts to oneself and to others. Hence, there is a very intimate 
connection between freedom of thought and freedom of speech. 
If externalization of mental content or communicative access to 
others is obstructed or otherwise significantly constricted, then 
speech is not free and, in turn, thought is not fully free. 
Second, some protections of freedom of thought are not 
directly forms of free speech protection, as those terms are 
commonly used, but because they either are so closely 
connected, or they implicate when speech may be restricted, 
they usefully fall under the label of a broadly understood ‘free 
speech’ theory. Two examples may illustrate my point: First, 
although direct efforts to manipulate others’ thoughts without 
restricting or manipulating their speech might be thought to 
jeopardize freedom of thought but not freedom of speech (or at 
least not freedom of speech directly), that separation seems too 
hasty. Some forms of thought control may take the form of 
speech (e.g. hypnotic, bombarding, or deliberately false speech). 
The thinker-based view would explain why that form of speech 
would not fall under the free speech protection but, rather, why 
that speech could be restricted (whether that speech is of 
government or private origin).4 Other forms of thought control 
 
 3. I happily concede, as some have pointed out, that after childhood, a few, e.g. 
monks, find an extended period of solitude clarifying (although most such people read 
and write, even if they do not regularly speak). 
 4. My seeming openness to regulating individual, non-commercial, non-libelous 
false speech offered to be taken as true may seem surprising given my strong free speech 
orientation. My view on this matter is tentative, but I believe I concur with Ed Baker’s 
view that intentionally false speech as such has only a precarious connection to the roots 
of the free speech protection. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH 11, 34, 289 n.39 (1989). Everyday, intentionally false, testimonial speech that 
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or thought interference might use no speech at all: e.g., 
electronic waves might be aimed at the brain to disrupt its 
function. Here, though, we might point out that this case 
implicates freedom of speech because the speech of the victim 
would no longer be the product of authentically generated 
thought (as would also be true of the prior case). Although our 
primary aim in response to these scenarios should be to protect 
the free thoughts of the potential victim, the connection to free 
speech is not far. 
Second, as Tim points out, access to information may be a 
necessary condition of freedom of thought, but it may not seem 
like the most natural locution to call restrictions on information 
provision abridgments of free speech. My response here takes a 
fairly similar form. Some withholding of information falls within 
the legitimate purview of individual privacy (some aspects of 
which are themselves essential to the individual qua thinker as I 
discuss below); perhaps some withholding falls within the 
purview of legitimate governmental secrecy. To fill out when 
information should be made available would require 
supplementing the thinker-based theory with a larger theory of 
acceptable privacy and secrecy. That supplementation does fall 
within the rubric of a ‘free speech’ theory because it concerns 
what sorts of things the government (and others) must speak 
about and what sort of speech they may legally refuse to engage 
in; further, when information is illegitimately withheld, free 
thought and free speech based on that thought is impaired. So, 
although I will not offer a theory of how broad the Freedom of 
Information Act should be and which part of it, if any, should be 
constitutionally mandated, I do think that the theory of its scope 
is an aspect of free speech theory and that the issue of 
information provision at least implicates so-called “free speech” 
values.5 
 
is offered to be taken as true by individuals that falls outside special categories (e.g. 
perjury, commercial speech, defamatory speech) might nevertheless gain full protection 
partly because its articulation is often part of an effort to sniff out the true and test one’s 
convictions and partly because policing sincerity that thoroughly would generate subzero 
chill and many false positives. See also Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First 
Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 1107, 1110 (2006) (discussing, among other things, “First Amendment limits on 
government power to control deceptive assertions in several different realms, and the 
much less appreciated First Amendment limits on government speech restrictions that 
carry out or impose deception by the government”).  
 5. Every aspect of the topic of information provision may not fall into the zone of 
judicially enforceable constitutional mandate, however, for two main reasons (both of 
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Third, the adequate conditions for freedom of thought may 
include measures like adequate food and other economic 
resources. Anti-poverty measures are not standardly thought to 
fall under the category of ‘freedom of speech.’ I surely grant that 
intuitive, ordinary language point. Whether the free speech 
protection should be more broadly interpreted to exude a 
penumbra that includes such measures that render the free 
speech protection meaningful is a venerable issue that implicates 
larger issues in constitutional theory and economic justice, the 
resolution of which is not entailed by the thinker-based theory 
on its own.6 I am content here merely to acknowledge that if one 
cares about the adequate conditions of freedom of thought, one 
would be lead to care about its material as well as its intellectual 
conditions, whether under a constitutional ‘free speech’ lens or 
under some other viewing device. 
Some might take the thrust behind some of these questions 
to suggest that a thinker-based theory seems to require more 
than the First Amendment is generally taken to cover. Further, 
this is a flaw because the theory is not well-tailored to explain 
and interpret the First Amendment speech clause, in particular. I 
agree that a concern about the social and material conditions 
adequate for free thought entails a larger agenda than is covered 
by freedom of speech, at least the judicially enforceable branch 
of that topic as it has been standardly interpreted. Perhaps the 
standard interpretation is correct. I am not sure of that (or of its 
particular limits) but the thinker-based approach is not 
inconsistent with the view that the First Amendment tackles 
 
which are themes that repeatedly come up below): some of the boundaries of permissible 
secrecy and privacy may reasonably be expected to evolve and morph over time. So, 
some aspects of information provision might be reasonably thought to be better handled 
by a constitutionally-guided and inspired legislature that (in theory) has a greater 
capacity for agility and flexibility to respond to changing circumstances; further, some 
issues of information provision go to the quality of thought and not the adequate 
conditions necessary for freedom of thought, so that some matters of information 
provision, e.g. funding for some research perhaps, may promote free speech values but 
not be strictly required by a free speech commitment. 
 6. See also Susan H. Williams, Free Speech and Autonomy: Thinkers, Storytellers, 
and a Systemic Approach to Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 399, 412 (2011); SUSAN H. 
WILLIAMS, TRUTH, AUTONOMY, AND SPEECH 222 (2004) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, 
TRUTH]. For a related prior discussion of such issues, see Frank Michaelman’s famous 
effort to argue that anti-poverty measures may have a constitutional foundation (albeit a 
different source) in Frank Michelman, Constitutional Welfare Rights and A Theory of 
Justice, in READING RAWLS 319, 343–44 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975) (discussing 
education in the context of Rawls’ opportunity principle). See also Frank Michelman, 
The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 13 
(2003). 
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only part of that agenda. The thinker-based approach may 
suggest that the foundations of freedom of speech may demand 
the government (and perhaps other social institutions) do more 
than the First Amendment, itself, requires. 
That consequence in itself should not feel surprising.7 The 
theoretical foundations of the 4th and 5th Amendments most 
likely involve privacy values whose natural extension and 
satisfaction conditions range beyond merely protecting against 
unwarranted searches and seizures and self-incrimination. Other 
First Amendment theories also have (salutary) overhang. 
Democracy theories, like Jim’s and Robert’s,8 draw on a 
commitment to democracy whose implications (e.g., one person-
one vote) range beyond how to treat speech on public affairs or 
more broadly, speech within public discourse. 
That does not mean that any of these theories suggest that 
the First Amendment, properly interpreted, does away with the 
state action requirement or the abridgement requirement, for 
that matter. “First Amendment values” may be promoted or 
satisfied by activities that the First Amendment itself does not 
require. In most circumstances, I take it that improvement or 
greater funding of the library system promotes First Amendment 
values but may not be required by the First Amendment. The 
acceptance of First Amendment values surely requires 
governmental attention to whether there is an adequate 
educational system in place. Perhaps the First Amendment itself 
requires government intervention or provision, as a backstop, if 
and on those occasions when other methods of provision fail, so 
that adequate schooling becomes unattainable for some portion 
of the citizenry, thereby threatening citizens’ minimal abilities to 
develop and exercise their capacities for free thought. Perhaps 
the First Amendment requires even more, especially when 
considered in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.9 Resolving this 
 
 7. Indeed, this is a closely related cousin of the worry about whether speech is, and 
need be, special. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker Based Approach to Freedom of 
Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283, 303 (2011). 
 8. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A 
Discussion, 97 VA. L. REV. 477 (2011); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the 
Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011). 
 9. A range of views on that question and its negative resolution are found in San 
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–39 (1973) (deferring to 
the legislature in choosing the most effective means to promote First Amendment 
values); id. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “any classification affecting 
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question fully would require a theory of where to locate the line 
between what inaction, if any, abridges freedom of speech and 
what inaction merely fails to promote the highest achievement of 
free speech values, some aspects of which may be left to non-
constitutional policy and some aspects of which may correctly lie 
at the feet of citizens to exercise their freedom well. Full 
identification of these lines would involve, among other things, a 
full theory of ‘abridgement’ as well as a theory of the substantive 
due process protection and how it bears on how we interpret the 
First Amendment guarantee and vice versa. 
Now we return to state action. The need for a larger 
constitutional theory to resolve some issues of scope and 
coverage is not uniquely triggered by the thinker-based theory, 
but arises for virtually all free speech theories. All First 
Amendment theories also have to answer the question why, if 
their theories have broader scope, are the constitutional 
protections more limited, e.g. why is there a state action 
requirement embedded in the First Amendment? (They need 
not, however, interpret the state action requirement as narrowly 
as the current Court and may be open to broader understandings 
of how private structures assume state functions or in what way 
the government may be responsible to ensure that they do not 
impede an adequate foundation for freedom of thought and 
adequate opportunities for its expression.) 
One adequate answer to this question is to interpret the 
state action requirement as rather more contingent and 
institutionally motivated than as deeply principled. Our 
Constitution is, generally, focused on enabling and constraining 
the state. Considering how, institutionally, we may implement 
our compulsory commitment to the conditions necessary for free 
thought, we may—in creating a state—think it crucial to ensure 
and to underline that the state itself not transgress the 
boundaries associated with this commitment. We may take this 
stance because: the state has historically posed a large threat to 
the realization of these values; or because this stance is the most 
salient symbolic public commitment to this value we can make 
while still preserving legislative flexibility in other domains; or, 
 
education must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny” because “education is inextricably 
linked to . . . the First Amendment”); id. at 112–17 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (similarly 
arguing that the “fundamentality of education” calls for heightened scrutiny for 
classifications affecting education and discussing First Amendment argument for 
constitutional basis for an equal funding requirement).  
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because the state constitutes the background structure and 
framework within which other social practices and institutions 
may evolve and be better managed through direct legislative 
control or through individual, decentralized control; or some 
combination of such reasons. 
All First Amendment theories, to be complete, must 
address whether the state action requirement is interpreted in a 
narrow way to require positive state action or whether certain 
forms of state inaction constitute acquiescence or a failure of 
duty of a sort that amounts to a governmental abridgment of 
freedom. I cannot take on the larger range of issues that 
question raises here, but I see no reason to worry that question is 
harder for a thinker-based theory to answer than the other free 
speech theories that must confront this issue as well. I think we 
can make progress on a wide variety of issues without resolving 
all boundary issues at the outset. 
To turn to a different issue, my claim that the thinker-based 
argument offers ‘greater unity’ and is more foundational than 
rival theories elicited, in somewhat different forms by Vince, 
Steve, and Tim, the quite reasonable question why that matters 
and why it should speak in favor of the theory. I may have put 
more emphasis on these features than they merit. A sheer 
theoretical preference for simplicity and unity should not be 
thought to do much work. On the other hand, many freedom of 
speech violations seem to offend against the same value—that, 
for instance, something similar is at stake between the disparate 
fact patterns of Brandenburg v. Ohio,10 West Virginia Board of 
Education v. Barnette,11 and Cantwell v. Connecticut.12 A theory 
that can vindicate, or more modestly, make some sense of the 
perceived connection between them would be desirable. Further, 
it seems desirable to avoid arbitrary distinctions or privileging of 
some activities over another, even when they—at bottom—are 
manifestations or aspects of the same value. Identifying the 
foundational value underlying speaker interests, for example, 
may help to ensure that we do not accidentally arbitrarily 
 
 10. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (overturning the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader for 
advocating violence and holding incendiary speech to be protected unless it is directed 
and likely to incite imminent illegal action). 
 11. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overturning a state law compelling school children to recite 
the pledge of allegiance). 
 12. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (overturning a state law requiring religious solicitors to 
obtain a license). 
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privilege speaker interests, per se, over other interests that share 
in the same underlying value but that perhaps, in the past, have 
not been under threat and hence have not been the subject of 
litigation.13 Identifying foundational interests may also help us to 
identify which free speech protections should be regarded as 
bedrock because a fundamental speech value is at stake, and 
which represent important, but perhaps instrumental or 
prophylactic, responses to particular, contingent social 
conditions. This kind of categorization may, I think, make a 
difference to how we approach some doctrinal questions.14 
Whether we view a protective stance against dissent as 
motivated by the special intrinsic value of dissent or by its 
tendency to be vulnerable in many political conditions may 
make a doctrinal difference. The latter view may give rise to 
special forms of epistemic scrutiny of regulations to ensure they 
are not motivated by conformism or the desire to protect the 
status quo, or to strong protections against retaliation for 
unwelcome speech or for other institutional, structural 
protections to ensure that vulnerability isn’t exploited; the 
former view may lead to more content-based distinctions, such 
as the sometimes misleading suggestion that parody in particular 
should be protected.15 Finally, unity that is achieved without 
oversimplification or false reduction may make the theoretical 
apparatus easier to apply, at least if (and this may be a 
questionable assumption) it is more manageable to work out the 
implications of one principle than to engage in the difficult task 
of relating one principle to another. 
Steve and Tim reasonably ask how other principles of 
freedom of speech and of other constitutional values relate to 
this principle. It is an entirely reasonable question the answer of 
 
 13. For these and related reasons, I have reservations about Frederick Schauer’s 
(spoken) suggestion at one of the Virginia symposium panels that a free speech theory 
should be designed around the threats freedom of speech actually faces. Although this is 
a natural target of attention, it is also important to theorize those freedoms that now 
seem entirely safe and internalized, both to protect against the emergence of threats that 
now seem unthinkable and also to recognize and validate the basis for the public 
acceptance, enjoyment, and acclaim for the right.  
 14. Depending upon how other matters in constitutional theory are resolved, it may 
also make a difference to whether a constitutional approach to the question is apt and 
what governmental agents should bear responsibility for its resolution. 
 15. See e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled 
Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 871 n.87 (2005); Amici Brief for Eugene Volokh & 
Erik S. Jaffe at 7–10, McFarlane v. Twist, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Miss. 2003) (No. 03-615), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1058 (2004), reprinted in 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004). 
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which I will have to defer to another occasion. I agree, however, 
with what is implicit in their question, namely that I do not think 
the thinker-based theory is the exclusive theory of the value of 
freedom of speech that should resonate in our jurisprudence. 
DILUTION 
Another methodological concern echoed in some of the 
critiques, e.g., by Jim and Vince, is one about dilution: A strong 
free speech theory with wide scope will entail a broad free 
speech protection that will inevitably be infringed or misapplied. 
The rationalizations rallied, in turn, to support these 
curtailments will themselves be used in a way that jeopardizes 
the most essential forms of speech. A more modest theory, one 
that at least identified and prioritized some core instances of 
speech, would provide a more secure theoretical bulwark for 
recurrent wavering about free speech. 
These predictions may, unfortunately, be accurate. Still, I do 
not believe that the ideal critical theory should be attentive to 
them in a way that results in substantial modifications. There is 
something quite strange about criticizing the content of a theory 
on the ground that it will be misunderstood, defied, or ignored in 
a particular institutional context or by particular institutional 
actors. The predictability of a pernicious misunderstanding does 
not demonstrate that the content, as such, is mistaken. By and 
large, a theory of the value of speech and of free speech should, I 
think, avoid barbering itself simply because we worry others are 
unreasonably scissor-happy, especially if the point of the theory 
is to illuminate and educate about when trims are apt and when 
growth, even to the point of shagginess, has more to recommend 
it. The more appropriate way to respond to concerns about 
mistakes in institutional implementation is in part, if the theory 
is correct, to do more by way of justification and education to 
avoid misinterpretation, rather than to assume interpreters are 
incorrigible. 
That said, I have no particular objection at the level of 
application to temporary and/or contingent institutional 
maneuvers, including doctrinal constructions, to protect against 
predictable errors. Identifying some sorts of speech as ‘core’ or 
‘untouchable’ may well serve the aim of ensuring that an alarm 
alert is triggered if restrictions threaten it. That strategy may 
ensure the predictable ebb and flow of politics and judicial 
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adjustments and reactions is not permitted to grow into a flood 
that threatens the levees. 
I would find more objectionable any (theoretical) 
stipulation, unsupported by a substantive ground for the 
distinction, that such core speech is qualitatively distinct from 
that speech deemed outside the core and that it is sufficiently 
distinct that the former falls in the scope of protection and the 
latter falls entirely outside it. I regard that stance as an 
overreaction to the perceived threats to freedom of speech and 
one that is inconsistent with the best theoretical arguments for 
the value of speech. Furthermore, arbitrary, strategic distinctions 
upon which a great deal of weight is put do not, I think, exert 
much protection in the long term. Their disingenuousness is 
detected and, consequently, they cannot support the burden they 
are asked to carry. 
THE NARRATIVE APPROACH TO AUTONOMY 
I am in large agreement with Susan, as she herself suggests. 
Indeed, we may be in more agreement than she thinks.16 
Although I believe our possession of autonomous capacities (for 
freedom of thought) merits respect, I agree that their 
development, expression, and the full achievement of their 
potential is a process that transpires over time and that the free 
speech protection aims to protect access to that process as well 
as instances along the way. I also agree that it is important to ask 
how social systems support or detract from the conditions that 
give rise to free thought. Indeed, I am not certain how deep our 
disagreements go, but I will mention a couple methodological 
points of potential divergence. 
Susan emphasizes, as I do not, characterizing autonomy as 
an effort to narrate one’s self and one’s commitments to others.17 
Although this idea of autonomy has a great deal of insight in it 
and certainly captures a large part of what is of value in many 
exercises of autonomy, I eschew this characterization for a few 
reasons. First, Susan’s position is motivated by a skepticism 
 
 16. See Williams, supra note 6, at 404 n.23.  Although, in a minor way, we may 
differ more than she thinks. In an approving tone, Susan characterizes the appeal to the 
thinker as a metaphor. Williams, supra note 6, at 404. I confess I do not mean it to 
operate as a metaphor, but since I am unsure what motivates her characterization, I do 
not know if much hangs on this difference. 
 17. Id. at 404–06; WILLIAMS, TRUTH, supra note 6, at 131–37. 
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about choice upon which I do not rely.18 An account of 
autonomous thought as thought that is not dictated or scripted 
by forces distinct or orthogonal to the relevant reasons that bear 
on what is thought about19 need not endorse or reject such 
skepticism. In that respect, my model is less controversial. 
Second, I worry that a narrative approach places an over-
emphasis on speech about or central to one’s self, one’s 
character, or the arc that characterizes one’s life.20 It also 
(perhaps only by connotation) seems to suggest a self already 
fairly far along in construction. I worry that this over-emphasis 
may orient our appreciation of the value of speech to speech 
about ourselves, rather than also directly on efforts to 
understand the world. I also worry it arbitrarily privileges speech 
that fits one’s narrative structure over speech that is out of 
character, and it does not (as) directly capture the speech of 
children and young adults whose self-narrative and 
commitments are still fledgling.21 One way to capture the 
difference between us (again perhaps only in connotation or 
perhaps more on emphasis and type of justification) is that my 
theory aims to offer an autonomy justification for speech 
instances (whether as thinker, speaker, or listener) as each an 
aspect or instance of the free development and exercise of the 
 
 18. Williams, supra note 6, at 408–10; WILLIAMS, TRUTH, supra note 6, at 149–50, 
200 (downplaying the importance of choice to narrative autonomy). 
 19. Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 409–11 (describing relevant form of authenticity). 
 20. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 148 (“In order for [a narrative] process to qualify as 
an exercise in autonomy, the meaning at issue must be personal: it must relate to the 
meaning of one’s own life.”). See also Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 286 n.7 (marking a related 
reservation about Joshua Cohen’s emphasis on significant speech in his deliberative 
democratic approach). 
 21. See Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 287 n.9.  I should clarify that, although I remarked 
in the target piece that children’s speech should partake in First Amendment protection 
more than current Court doctrine allows, I do not think adults’ and children’s speech 
rights run in absolute parallel. For example, I surely believe that mandatory education 
requirements are simpler to justify with respect to children (because they must come to 
possess minimally developed capacities for thought) than they are for adults. See also 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1232 (2010) (“[O]nce citizens have achieved adulthood, efforts 
to enroll adults in compulsory forms of education violate their rights of autonomy and, in 
particular, their freedom of thought.”); Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 880–88 (explaining, 
among other things, why children’s associational rights are less robust than the 
associational rights of adults).  A more nuanced theory would also have to be developed 
for the mentally disabled and demented who are, as I have argued elsewhere, capable of 
some forms of autonomy but may nevertheless reasonably be subject to different 
treatment to respect that autonomy. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Autonomy, 
Beneficence, and the Permanently Demented, in DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS 195 (Justine 
Burley ed., 2004).  
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autonomous thinker; Susan’s theory characterizes the relevant 
exercise of autonomy as occurring over an extended period of 
time for which individual speech instances are partial 
components but not fresh exercises of autonomy as such. 
Third, the emphasis of Susan’s theory is one in which 
communication with others is taken as the paradigm case and the 
paradigm source of value or justification, whereas my theory 
aims to allow personal diaries and musings and other purely 
intra-personal communication to be as paradigmatic as 
communications to others, but without assimilating intrapersonal 
communication to the model of communication between 
people.22 
We both strive to stress the role of the social and the 
relational in accounts of individual autonomy. In my theory, 
access to and opportunities for social communicative relations 
are essential for a complete set of apt conditions for thought 
formation, evaluation of ideas, and moral relations, which 
themselves are the sites of individual autonomy; in Susan’s 
theory, social communicative relations are more directly the sites 
of autonomous exercise. 
ELITISM 
Finally, Vince wonders whether the theory is overly 
rationalist and even elitist. He worries it might be interpreted to 
extend only to highly deliberate and articulate speech, issued 
from thinkers self-consciously dedicated to nurturing and 
developing the interests I articulate, or, more mildly, to imagine 
their speech as the core of what is to be protected.23 
I am anxious to dispel this impression. Being, acting like or 
aspiring to a bookish bent is neither a necessary condition of free 
speech protection, nor is the cultivation or production of such 
figures an aim or background ideal of the theory. Ironically, I 
had hoped to design the theory to avoid the pitfalls of hyper-
intellectualism, but I may have contributed to a misimpression 
by not drawing attention to this aspiration. 
 
 22. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 150–54 (narrative autonomy is dependent on social 
connection); id. at 200–04 (arguing that, at least for symbolic speech, the speaker must 
intend to convey a meaning and the audience must understand that the speaker is 
attempting to convey a meaning). 
 23. See Vincent Blasi, Seana Shiffrin’s Thinker-Based Freedom of Speech: A 
Response, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 310–12 (2011). 
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By stressing the role of emotional responses and reactions 
as a part of the way rational capacities encode their responses to 
the world and manifest them to others, the articulated interests 
of thinkers to which the theory aims to be responsive are not 
restricted to the discursively cognitive.24 This more expansive 
conception of the person is then reflected in the theory’s effort 
to cover, directly and at the outset, art, music, banal 
interpersonal conversations as well as associational connections, 
whether or not they have an articulate point.25 By stressing the 
role others may have to play in forming one’s thoughts26 as well 
as the welcome tentativeness of some speech, the theory also 
makes clear that speech need not be well-formulated or 
articulate to gain protection or to be celebrated by the theory. 
True, the theory stresses the connection between opportunities 
for externalized thought and access to the thoughts and reactions 
of others and the conditions necessary for citizens to become full 
moral agents and the sort of informed individuals who can make 
most sense of our democratic commitments.27 Still, those 
desiderata may be promoted by the free speech guarantee while 
being met by a wide range of people in a variety of ways 
(although I certainly would defend the opportunity to develop 
one’s cognitive capacities into a bookish bent). 
 
 24. Indeed, I might also add that the need to externalize mental content whether to 
gain distance from it, to help to formulate it more determinately, or to convey it to others 
holds true as much of children, the mentally disabled, and those suffering dementia as of 
the highly educated and the basic normative importance of ensuring the opportunity to 
satisfy that need does not substantially vary depending upon the sophistication of the 
mind at issue. 
 25. See Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 285–87; Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 875 (“The 
autonomous agent must have some ability to control what influences she is exposed to, to 
what subjects she directs her mind, and whether she, at all times, directs her mind toward 
anything at all or instead ‘spaces out’ and allows the mind to relax and wander.”).  
 26. Steve characterizes this view of intimate associations as instrumental, but 
stresses that friendships and other intimate associations have intrinsic value, involving 
substantial and substantive forms of altruism. Steven H. Shiffrin, Freedom of Speech and 
Two Types of Autonomy, in 27 CONST. COMMENT. 337, 344 (2011). I hasten to agree. 
Because the thinker-based approach stresses the importance of having access to the 
opportunities necessary to be known as a distinctive individual as well as to behave 
morally and treat others well, see Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 291–92, I regard it as 
(implicitly) acknowledging these intrinsic values and as arguing that the free speech 
protects this avenue of access for thinkers. Whether they follow that path and use it well 
is, of course, an aspect of their freedom and responsibility. 
 27. Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 294–96. 
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UNDERINCLUSIVITY 
Some worry a thinker-based theory will, in some respects, 
be insufficiently protective of speech. Relative to other 
autonomy theories, the thinker-based theory confronts fewer 
issues of under-inclusivity because it subsumes (and unifies) the 
sweep of both speaker and listener-based theories, while also 
directly addressing those threats to the authenticity of the 
thought process that may not directly impinge upon speaker or 
listener interests as they are often articulated. 
So, in reply to Eugene, although protecting access to the 
speech of the dead is typically disconnected from the thinker-
oriented needs of the deceased to communicate with 
contemporaries, that speech squarely connects to each living 
thinker’s interests in access to other minds and their perceptions 
as a way of understanding one’s environment. Understanding 
one’s environment frequently involves understanding history 
and the information contained within historical perspectives. So 
too, access to the speech of the deceased connects to thinkers’ 
interests in being well treated by other agents, from whom 
relevant insights, messages, perspectives, and information may 
be owed and conveyed, even once they are deceased. 
In this respect, ensuring protection for the speech of the 
dead also protects contemporary thinkers’ interests qua 
speakers. Discharging moral duties we now have to future 
generations may require that we have the free opportunity to 
communicate with them and to contribute to the human cache of 
knowledge by leaving a record of our thoughts that persists after 
our deaths. This current interest of ours may be frustrated 
retroactively by a future regulation or restriction on distribution 
of the speech of the dead. In sum, both speaker and listener 
interests are stymied by restrictions on access to the publications 
of the deceased. 
This rationale for protecting the speech of the dead does not 
threaten to unravel the argument I earlier sketched to explain 
why non-press, for-profit commercial or corporate speech might 
legitimately receive a different sort of treatment or be subject to 
a different level of review on a thinker-based account. That 
argument, broadly rendered, was that, for reasons related to our 
economic endeavors, the structure in which commercial and 
corporate speech is produced does not show sufficient sensitivity 
and pushes against the issuance of authentic, sincere speech by 
!!SHIFFRINSEANNA-272-REPLYTOCRITICS3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011  9:40 AM 
432 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:417 
 
 
individual thinkers. Rather, its content is largely determined by 
the needs imposed by the marketplace, the structure of which is 
not designed to serve the underlying interests of thinkers as 
such, but rather to make such authenticity highly unlikely and 
possibly destructive to the speakers’ own economic interests. 
The structure encourages indifference to the (perceived) truth 
and so, its output has a strained and unreliable connection to the 
interests, even the listener-based interests, that propel a thinker-
based protection since these are keyed primarily to the sincere 
expressions of speakers’ perceptions, beliefs, opinions, etc., and 
their genuine efforts to represent the world and themselves. 
Of course, corporate speech is written and conveyed by real 
individuals, but given the corporate hierarchical structure as well 
as the pressures associated with the larger economic structure 
within which they speak, there is no reason to think this speech 
reflects their personal, sincere thoughts; the fact individuals 
author the speech does not undercut my argument that the 
speech may be more susceptible to regulation, although it would 
suggest that such regulations should not demand individuals 
engage in insincere or false speech. And, of course, as I argued 
earlier, any motivation for regulation must itself be consistent 
with acceptance of the values underlying the free speech 
protection. The ethical difficulties presented by those tensions 
between the content dictated by employers’ agendas and the 
employee’s sincere convictions, however, may suggest a much 
more speech- and dissent-protective approach to employee 
speech than the Court has recognized in such cases as Connick v. 
Myers,28 and, more recently, in Garcetti v. Ceballos.29 
Susan asks why corporate and commercial speech is any 
more determined or coerced than speech by members of a 
religious group;30 I take it that, with respect to some groups, her 
concern is that members’ dissent may earn them expulsion and 
 
 28. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See also STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND 
THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 110 n.144 (1999) (arguing that the Connick decision is less 
than “admirable”). 
 29. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). I discuss related tensions and pressures on integrity that 
employees may face in the contract context when they form promises on behalf of 
companies and place their own integrity at stake, but may not control the decision 
whether to perform and may be under structural pressure to treat promises on behalf of 
corporations less seriously than promises they initiate on their own behalf. Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 
746–49 (2007).  
 30. Williams, supra note 6, at 407–08. 
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this is analogous to the market death that Crest (to take a purely 
hypothetical case) would suffer if it gamely admitted in its 
advertising that its product was worse than its rivals, just higher-
priced. I do not deny that sincerity and unpopular speech may 
often come with great costs, but I regard the differences as 
follows: The market and legal pressures for Crest to do what it 
can to stay in business are tighter and greater than the pressures 
for a religious thinker not to change her mind in light of her 
sincere doubts. Moreover, Crest is a simpler entity with a less 
complex set of interests. When a believer changes her mind in 
light of her sincere doubts, she serves her own interests as a 
thinker directly by responding to what she takes to be the truth. 
Her continued affirmation of religious tenets furthers her 
interests as a thinker only if that affirmation is actually sincere. 
Further, although her expulsion from a religious community may 
involve tremendous costs, it does not (typically) involve her 
complete eradication. Whereas, Crest’s interests to maximize 
profit and to survive in a competitive market are not furthered 
by its sincere admission that its products are inferior (except and 
only insofar as it has instrumental reasons to admit this when it 
believes others have already perceived this). The actual sincerity 
or insincerity or accuracy of its communications are irrelevant to 
its interests, except to the extent that these play an instrumental 
role in gaining or retaining market position, because of others’ 
perception or because of the sort of regulations I am arguing are 
constitutionally palatable. 
Much more should be said in a full treatment of this topic, 
including something about the more complex case of non-profit 
corporations that operate in a market environment and the case 
of other market actors pursuing morally infused agendas.31 But, 
in brief, as a general, probably exception-ridden matter, I take 
for-profit, non-press commercial speech to be different from 
individual and expressive associational speech (and therefore 
subject to different standards of review, not necessarily 
prohibitable outright) because of the fiercely competitive and 
fairly inflexible environment in which the former operates and 
because the commercial entity’s interests are so narrowly limited 
so that the accuracy and sincerity of its speech are valuable to it 
only if instrumentally that is made to be the case. Its narrowness 
 
 31. I began a tentative discussion of the morally motivated market actors in Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Morality, and Market Dynamics, 41 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 317 (2007). 
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is no surprise: the non-press commercial entity is not a really a 
person and with some important exceptions, for the most part, 
the quality of its speech and its products do not intrinsically 
enhance or detract from the satisfaction of its interests or aims 
depending upon whether they are sincere, accurate, morally 
sensitive, or wildly reckless. These features do not hold to as 
great a degree of individuals, nor are they structurally true of 
them. 
OVER-INCLUSIVITY 
Jim raises two concerns that roughly amount to worries 
about over-inclusivity: his worry that this approach would 
protect harassing speech and the concern that it would extend 
high levels of protection to scientific research, even that research 
whose dissemination threatens significant harm. As I read him, 
he believes both that such protection is implausible but also, that 
whatever its merits, courts could not live with this result; judicial 
methods of avoiding it, however, would inevitably threaten the 
protection of core, democratic speech. So, although the worry 
originally registers as one about overinclusivity, its after-echo 
resonates as one about overly scant protection: in an institutional 
context, a theory that extends such wide protection will 
inexorably be scaled back in blunt ways that threaten essential 
speech. 
The first case is the simpler one to address. As I have 
argued, it is to the credit of the thinker-based approach that it 
handily protects speech between intimates in private as well as 
between citizens in the public sphere. I think it may readily, 
however, distinguish harassing speech on the grounds that it 
does not involve a consensual communicative relation. Although 
as thinkers we have an interest in expressing our thoughts and in 
being known, we do not have a right to command the personal 
audience of any other thinkers we like, irrespective of their 
interests in hearing us out. That would not be compatible with 
the other’s autonomy as a thinker since each of us also has an 
interest qua thinker in being left alone and maintaining a sphere 
of privacy free from unwanted intrusion by others. One cannot 
be a free thinker while being subject to intrusions that overtake 
one’s mental agenda. Protecting opportunities to satisfy thinkers’ 
interests both in privacy and in forging relationships with others 
can be done by permitting restrictions on nonconsensual but 
targeted and intrusive contact, even that contact that solely 
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involves speech, while still protecting consensual interpersonal 
communication as well as public proclamations and revelations, 
even if offensive and even if they concern particular individuals. 
So, if Melvin directs his confessions at Miranda personally and 
she objects, his speech to her thereafter may be curtailed on the 
grounds that it infringes upon her thinker-based interests in 
maintaining a sphere in which she may enjoy privacy of the 
mind. Assuming they do not share a workplace, 32 I do not think 
she has a legitimate claim, however, to enjoin all efforts by 
Melvin to engage in purely public forms of self-revelation, even 
if his revelatory remarks are about her and offend her, so long as 
she in particular is not made to listen to his remarks.33 
As for scientific speech, the thinker-based approach 
probably would extend protection fairly far, as Jim suspects. I 
am less convinced that this constitutes an embarrassment for the 
approach. Although publication of formulas for virulent 
biotoxins makes me very uneasy, so too does the history of past, 
and prospect of further, state suppression of scientific research 
that threatened governmental or corporate power or the state’s 
 
 32. I discuss some of the reasons why anti-discrimination laws that limit speech 
content may have a permissible role in workplaces and other spheres of predominantly 
economic activity in Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 877–78.  
 33. Thus, the outcome of Snyder v. Phelps seems correct, despite the abhorrent 
behavior of the protestors. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (finding peaceful 
protestors who picketed a military funeral on public land 1000 feet from the funeral and 
who displayed provocative and aggressive signs were shielded from tort liability for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress by the First Amendment). Although the 
Phelps’ organization unquestionably behaved in a brutally insensitive way, the fact that 
the protest was located a substantial distance from the funeral and that Mr. Snyder was 
unaware of the content of their protest signs until he later encountered videos and other 
reports of them in the public sphere, via television news coverage and later on the 
internet, suggests the 1000 foot time, place, and manner restriction was sufficient to 
protect the Snyder family’s reasonable privacy interests on the occasion of the funeral. In 
that light, Mr. Snyder’s complaint seems to reduce to offense at the content of the 
Phelps’ speech and its issuance on and association with the occasion of Matthew Snyder’s 
funeral. The sphere of privacy necessary for thinker autonomy cannot reasonably be 
construed to extend so far as to prevent non-libelous, sincere public discourse about an 
individual just because its critical content is offensive or distressing.  
It is arguable, however, that the U.S. approach does not extend far enough to 
protect against incursions to privacy caused by non-consensual truthful revelation of 
purely private information; such revelations arguably violate an individual’s discretionary 
power over whether and when to reveal herself to others. England currently takes a 
different approach. Contrast Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd., [2004] UKHL 
22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding a tabloid liable for violating the 
privacy of a famous model by revealing specific details of the model’s drug rehabilitation 
treatment) with Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (finding unconstitutional a 
Florida law permitting civil liability for publication of the accidentally revealed name of a 
rape victim). 
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orthodoxy about religion, safety, or other matters.34 Scientific 
speech may constitute an arena in which we regulate strongly the 
uses to which it is put and otherwise, we have to depend upon 
the good judgment of fellow citizens about what should be 
published, what knowledge would better remain privately held 
and undisseminated, and, on the audience side, to what uses 
information should be put. This seems to me little different than 
much of the rest of free speech practice. Incendiary and 
offensive political speech may merit legal protection, but in a 
well-functioning polity, citizens will have to develop and exercise 
good judgment about when to engage in it and when, as 
audience members, to take it seriously. Not all political 
sentiments should be voiced or acted upon just because we offer 
the opportunity to voice and consider them. Having the 
opportunity to engage in speech may be essential to protecting 
the autonomy of thinkers, but that does not mean that the theory 
recommends its exercise. It shouldn’t be news that, as with 
democracy more generally, a free speech regime requires a 
measure of trust in fellow citizens that will, at times, create 
anxiety and discomfort. The thinker-based theory does not 
freshly introduce this dependence. 
Of course, some transmissions of scientific information may 
constitute a part of a criminal attempt or an effort to further a 
criminal conspiracy, when provided at the relevant time to 
someone attempting to use the information to commit a crime. 
Such uses could be regulated as falling more on the speech-act 
side than on the pure speech side. Finally, I should observe that, 
doctrinally, assuming scientific and political speech are treated 
with parity, then situations where publication would create 
significant, immediate harm might submit to regulation 
compatible with the application of strict scrutiny. But, I concede 
that the intermediate cases Jim is most worried about further 
developed in his excellent article on the subject,35 in which 
publication of scientific research may threaten important ends 
but not compelling state interests, may well be protected on this 
analysis. 
 
 34. The relevance of much scientific speech to policy decisions as well as historical 
governmental efforts to suppress scientific speech that might embarrass the government 
or generate the basis for state liability suggest that it is not so evident that scientific 
speech does not make a contribution to our resolution of public questions. If so, it is less 
clear the problems Jim raises are clearly segregable on a democracy approach.  
 35. James Weinstein, Democracy, Individual Rights and the Regulation of Science, 
15 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 407 (2009). 
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Finally, Steve wonders whether my effort to justify strong 
protections for art entail that the same protection should be 
extended to image advertising that would extend to 
informational advertising. His question implies a concern that 
image advertisements are more powerful in illicit ways—that 
they influence viewers in substantial ways that are not 
perceptible to them. This, of course, may also be true of political 
rhetoric and persuasive speech. An aspect of the responsibility of 
autonomous thinkers is to be aware of the influences they may 
be subject to and to assess and police that influence.36 On the 
other hand, some modes of communication may circumvent or 
evade our capacities to engage in such self-regulation either writ 
large or writ small; thereby, they may threaten thinkers’ capacity 
to form authentic, unscripted thoughts.37 I have in mind the 
popular conceptions of brainwashing techniques, subliminal 
messages, and hypnosis (which, notably, often involve words). I 
do not know whether our popular conceptions are accurate or 
apocryphal or whether some forms of image advertising (or, as 
some have alleged, pornography, fighting words, or face-to-face 
hate speech) work on us in ways that significantly obstruct or 
impair the exercise of responsible assessment and self-
management. If substantial evidence suggested that image 
advertising resisted or stymied otherwise competent, responsible 
 
 36. Full treatment of this issue would require a more elaborate account of what 
responsibilities listeners may be expected to bear, but that, unfortunately, is beyond the 
scope of this discussion. Briefly and generally, though, it seems fair to ask listeners to 
exercise responsibility over how they allow the sincere speech of interlocutors to affect 
them (e.g. whether to believe or remain skeptical, whether to guard against emotional 
impact or use emotional force as a guide to plausibility, etc.), assuming that speech does 
not disable or circumvent the capacities that undergird such responsibility. For, 
exercising that responsibility involves using the thinkers’ critical capacities while at the 
same time permitting the speakers’ capacities for thought and expression to be fully and 
freely implemented; the opportunity and value of both exercises underlies the 
justification and value of free speech and its protection. It is arguable that this general 
argument may have less traction, however, when the speech involves matters about 
which listeners’ responsibility could only be exercised competently if the listener had 
well-developed expertise that it is unreasonable to expect listeners to cultivate. Hence, 
we might subject speech by experts directed at lay people to higher standards of accuracy 
or care. So too a heavy burden of epistemic responsibility, broadly construed, on the 
listener may also be inapt in the case of insincere, false speech, particularly with respect 
to information that is not readily accessible or publicly verifiable by listeners (e.g. 
speakers’ mental contents). Deliberately false speech may also jeopardize many of the 
conditions under which speech generally has value and this also cuts against the claim 
speakers have a foundational interest in expressing deliberately false speech (represented 
as true). I discuss the threat lies pose to the moral function of communication in Seanna 
Shiffrin, Lies and the Murderer-Next-Door (unpublished manuscript). 
 37. Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 288, 299–300. 
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agents’ reasonable efforts at effective methods of avoidance, 
reflection, assessment, and revision, then I believe a thinker-
based approach would have the resources to suggest such speech 
was more susceptible to regulation to limit such exposure to 
destructive and disabling effects, especially with respect to 
children. Of course, these points are only suggestive and a more 
comprehensive treatment would be necessary to settle the issue. 
Regretfully, I have not attempted to answer many worthy 
issues raised in the group’s rich and stimulating replies. With 
respect to those issues I have addressed, the treatment is overly 
cursory. I look forward to thinking further about these questions 
for some time to come and I reiterate my appreciation to the 
group for their critical engagement with these still preliminary 
ideas. 
 
